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This essay presents a three-fold analysis of militarism 
ir South Asia  ^ Part I will evaluate the degree and type of 
militarism m  the region and its ma]or states concentrating 
upon the economic political and military burden Dart IT 
will e amine the causes and consequences of the three most 
important regional conflicts those between India and 
Pakistan and India and China and the recent Soviet m/asior 
of Afahanistan Part III suggests ways m  which reaional 
states and sympathetic outside powers might pursue 
strategies of regional conflict amelioration— and even
resolution
3I MILITARISM IV SOUTH ASIA
We subscribe to Stanislav; Andreski s dissection of the 
term militarism 2 He distinguishes between 1) rule by the 
military (which might be labeled militocracy), 2) the
elevation of martial symbols and the military within a 
society (as m  Prussia), 3) the inculcation of certain 
military or material traits within a society (such as 
discipline order and obedience best exemplified by 
Leninist states) and finally external aggressiveness or 
belligerence To these we might add the total quantity of 
resources allocated to defense and security policy (often 
exnressed as a percentage of GNP spent on defense) The 
latter fiqure is ambiguous it indicates the degree of 
military burden carried bv a state but not whether that 
burden is appropriate to its external threats or whether 
defense monies are efficiently spent
The above elaboration of the ambiquous term militarism 
raises several questions Does rule by the military imply 
an aggressive foreign policy, or even an excessive defense 
burden7 Alfred Vagt s classic study of civilian militarism 
suagests this may not always be the case J Does the 
existence of a genuine external threat enhance the political 
power of the military7 And above all if such linkaaes do 
exist are they irreversible7 Will the amelioration of 
external conflict lead to lessening of defense budgets the
4return of civilian rule and the restoration of pluralist 
civic norms7 Conversely would the restoration of civilian 
rule to a state like Pakistan ease its strategic problems7 
The evidence of recent history (Argentina and Pakistan come 
to mind) suggests that such generalizations must be accepted 
with caution
The Economic Burden^
South Asia s fiscal defense burden is in the low-middle 
ranqe (2 9% of GNP) higher than Latin America s remarkable 
1 2% but less than every other region— Africa s 3 2% the 
Tar East s 3 2^ and the Middle East s startling 10 9% It 
is even lower than the collective developing world s 4 3° 
Within the region °akistan has the highest defense 
expenditure as a percent of GNP about 5% (India b e m a  
under 3°) Pakistan also has a considerably higher defense 
expenditure per capita ($13, compared with India s $ 5 and 
Banqladesh s $1) and it also has about three times the 
number of soldiers per capita than India (6 3 per 1000 
compared with India s 1 9 per 1000) The overall picture 
then is of a region with large armies but larqer 
populations, diverting a modest amount of resources to 
military purposes Only Pakistan begins to fall into that 
class of states which are relatively poor (per capita income 
between S300 and $500) and which spend more than 5% on 
defense (others include China Tanzania Somalia Lebanon
5Ethiopia, and Vietnam)
Is this a burden either regionally or for individual 
states7 One school of thought has it that these 
expenditures are both reasonable (given the actual security 
threats) and may serve positive non-security goals The 
resources available for defense may not be otherwise 
available— or at least available to the central 
government— and defense spending thus contributes to the 
overall integrity and economic growth of the state 5
I regard this line of argument both as implausible and 
unsupported by e/idence from either the developed or the 
developing states It ignores the fact that p aood portion 
of defense spendirg m  South Asia (but we do not ''enow 
exactly hew much— 15%7) is in the form of scarce hard 
currency for the import of weapons ammunition spare parts 
and the purchase of services (ship and aircraft repair 
personnel training) from advanced industrial states In 
India and Pakistan arms imports constituted between five an^ 
ten percent of total imports between 107? and 1980 and the 
figure is probably higher row significantly the early 
expectation that large arms purchases would yield to 
indigenous production has proven incorrect nor has either 
mounted a significant arms export program Banqladesh 
Nepal, and Sri Lanka, of course maintain miniscule military 
establishments, with uniformly obsolete equipment, and spend 
only about 1% of their small GNP on the military
6The Political Burden
The military role within the South Asian states is also 
quite evident although Andreski s subtle but vital 
distinction between military rule and military ideals should 
be kept in mind Pakistan had strona military influence in 
politics even before Ayub s 1958 coup 6 Military rule ended 
onlv m  1972 and Zu]fiqar All Bhutto headed a civilian 
government until Zia s coup of 1 ^ 7  Zia now governs (as 
did Ayub and his successor Yahya Khan) through the military 
and civil bureaucracies and with the cooperation of a aocd 
number of civilian poiiticians--although h° remains a nuc> 
less popular fiaure than Ayub Zia has promisee elections 
in 1985 / but the question of the role of political parties 
the status of the 1973 constitution or Zia s own role and 
that of the military all remain unexplained
Interestingly Bangladesh continues on as if it werQ 
part of Pakistan Aside from a brief spell of civilian rule 
under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman it too, has been dominated by 
soldiers who stress domestic order, national security and 
state (l e military) integrity as justification for their 
continuation m  power And as in Pakistan this approach 
nas a degree of popularity although widespread support for 
a return to democratic politics co-exists even within the 
military
India and Sri Lanka retain their democratic political
7systems, almost alone m  South Asia This has rot been done 
without strain Both states have seen the centralization of 
authority to the point of dictatorship But m  both the 
military has not played a significant role m  politics 
(except for a coup attempt in Sri Lanka some time ago)  ^
However India has seen the emergence of a form of civilian 
militarism— a stress on martial virtues and values, the 
elevation of the military as a national symbol and the 
emergence since 1965 of a military—industrial-political
pcomplex that would have deeply upset Jawaharlal Nehru 
As in Israel the U S and other democracies under pressure 
India s arms burden is beginning to corrode part of its 
political soul— with kickbacks, lucrative defense contracts 
retired generals on retainer and the militarization of 
public rhetoric
The Military Burden
A final dimension of militarism m  South Asia is 
evident m  the many armed conflicts that have occurred in 
the region since 1947 These fall into five categories 
First there was a period of national consolidation m  which 
the dominant regional states India and Pakistan absorbed 
reluctant principalities or populations (especially in 
Hyderabad m  1949, and to some degree Kashmir) Second 
there have been conflicts of the periphery against the 
center In both India and Pakistan there ^re major tribal
8populations (Nagas Baluch Pathars, and others) which 
forcibly resist political or cultural association, fearincr 
absorption In Sri Lanka there are estranged elements of 
the Tamil minority who seek some form of independence or 
affiliation of the Tamil north with their fellow-Tamils m  
India These types of disputes are important but shall not 
concern us here They are amenab]e to good government and 
aood sense and will not likely threaten the integrity of 
India Pakistan or Sri Lanka unless these states are caught 
up m  a larger conflict Thes^ have been of two types 
One is the several wars fought between India and 
Pakistan In a sense these would not have been fought had 
Partition not created two separate states m  19^7 These 
wars— 1947 1965 1971— have involved hundreds of thousands
of troops and billions of dollars of military equipment 
Indo-Pakistani conflict has a special quality about it 
more than one general on either side has characterized these 
struqgles as a communal riot with armor The very 
identity of Pakistan (an avowedly Islamic state) and India 
(a secular state with a large Hindu majority) stand as a 
challenge to the other The continuing struggle over 
Kashmir— with its predominately Muslim population under 
Indian control— is widely described either as one of the 
main causes of conflict between the two states, or as a 
consequence of their mutual distrust it may be both at the 
9same time
9The second type of war m  the region has pitted 
regional states against non-regional powers the 1962 
Smo-Indian war and the 1^79 invasion of Afghanistan by the 
Soviet Union are best seen as the latest examples of a long 
search for influence (if not dominance) m  the limitrophic 
shatter-zone The names of the players have changed, but 
elements of the great game remain it still does matter 
to China, the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan who controls 
the marchland across their borders States such as Nepal 
and Afghanistan have survived by maintaining a tenuous 
balance between their powerful neighbors recent events in 
the latter indicate how tenuous it is and how great the 
price of miscalculation For India and Pakistan the 
situation is further complicated by the sometimes confusing 
role that the U S has played for at least twenty years 
While motivated primarily by considerations of 
anti-communism American support has necessarily affected 
the relationship between these two states, sometimes 
defeating the original purpose of assistance
Finally we must also note the possibility of a fifth 
type of conflict m  South Asia nuclear war ^  It is 
conceivable that by the end of the decade both India and 
Pakistan will have acquired the capability of delivering at 
least a few nuclear weapons India's nuclear objectives are 
probably quite ambitious a missile system capable of 
reaching China Pakistan only seeks a few weapons to deter
10
India In either case there are major implications for the 
way in which these two states might fiqht a conventional war 
m  the future a nuclear weapon will force maior changes m  
strategy and tactics it might also provide the umbrella 
under which massive conventional wars can take place— just 
as it might make the dangers of escalation so great that 
such wars will never occur again And of great importance 
will be the effect of an Indian or Pakistani nuclear system 
on the war plans of the major nuclear powers (two of which 
adjoin the region) 11
This brief survey of the dimensions of militarism in 
Couth Asia seems to support two general conclusions The 
first is that South Asia has suffered from persistent 
interstate conflict of varying types and persistent 
oraetorianism m  two of its major states In t m s  South 
Asia resembles the Middle East or South East Asia more than 
Latin America although it has escaped the burden of heavy 
arms spending The example of the past however, does not 
offer much comfort for the future war, rule by the 
military and chronic conflict— even nuclear war— are well 
within the range of the possible
Our second general conclusion is that to some degree 
these regional conflicts are interactive, not merely 
additive The intra-state separatist and autonomist 
movements draw encouragement (and at times material 
support) from other states which challenge the very country
11
they oppose (Nage rebels receiving support from China/ 
Sindhis and Baluchis in Pakistan receiving support from 
India Kashmiris m  India receiving support from Pakistan 
Nepali opposition groups receiving support from India, to 
name a few) The process then repeats itself at another 
level regional states have exploited (and m  turn been 
exploited by) the superpowers and Chini as the latter have 
offered assistance to one country or another m  South Asia 
either to balance the influence of the other superpower or 
Cnina
II mhE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF SOUmH ftSIAN NAP 
Three ma]or conflicts form the centerpiece of our 
concern the enduring India-Pal istan cold/hot war the 
faded but still potent India-China border dispute and the 
very active Soviet presence m  Afghanistan The first 
divides the Subcontinent against itself and is thus 
partially responsible for the second and third events or sc 
the logic of strategy and history wouV imply But if South 
Asia has been nade vulnerable because of the dispute which 
divides it, were that dispute to be resolved could the 
penetration from the Northeast and Northwest be reversed7 
Our short answer is yes Such a resolution is a 
necessary althouqh not a sufficient condition for the 
expulsion of non-reqional states from the area We 
therefore turn first to the intra-regional conflict
1?
particularly as it is seen by the participants themselves
The India-Pakistan Dispute
Indians and Pakistanis trace their present political 
and military stalemate back to events surrounding the 
partition of British India in 1947— and thus long before 
cold war considerations played a role m  reqional affairs 
Their dispute over the status of Kashmir led to a 
limited war m  1947-48 and a postwar search for allies and 
weapons This m  turn almost triggered a war m  the 1950s 
after India was plunaed into a ma]or conflict with China in 
196° it received some military assistance from the test 
This aid shifted the balance between Ind^a and Pakistan and 
shaped perceptions and expectations m  both states, leading 
to a minor skirmish and then a manor war m  1965 a aam over 
Kashmir The way in which this war was fought finned 
secessionist feelings m  East Pakistan when these feelmas 
were expressed through the ballot box and a civil upnsinq 
they led to the events (especially the mass movement of 
refugees from East Pakistan into Indja) which caused India 
to consider its options and then assume de f^cto direction 
of the Bangladesh liberation movement A full-scale 
invasion in the East led directly to the creation of the 
state of Bangladesh
During that war a decision was taken by India \hich 
prepared the ground for escalation into the nuclear
13
dimension Concerned about India s lack of political 
support and the outright hostility of Pakistan's powerful 
allies, Indira Gandhi authorized work on a nuclear explosive 
device a year later, Zulfiqar All Bhutto initiated 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program
To the degree that India and Pakistan have responded to 
each other, and have sought outside support against each 
other there is a strong interactive element m  their 
relationship '’his is also seen (as we have noted above) in 
the differing national identities of secular democratic 
India and avov/edly Islamic Pakistan the fac+- that P^kistar 
has survived as a nation is an affront to the secular 
outlook of Nehru and Gandhi the fact that millions of 
Muslims live m  relative peace within India is an affront to 
the very idea of Pakistan dealinq with each other through 
normal diplomatic channels is seen by some as almost 
treasonous, just as many Israelis will not countenance 
negotiations with the PLO and few, if any prominent Arab 
leaders dare advocate negotiations with Israel The same 
problem arises in the most mundane exchanges between the two 
states Indian films (vastly superior in quality) are 
banned m  Pakistan (as is the film Gandhi) the states have 
never exchanged scholars or students, and newspapers books 
and journals do not circulate freely between the two 
(although modern technology, through the medium of the VCR, 
has circumvented many of these restrictions and there is
14
widespread illicit circulation of foreign films m  both 
states
Finally, the India-Pakistan conflict has a strategic 
dimension The two states were carved out of an imperial 
whole No British general expected that they would go to 
war and their borders are utterly artificial in that they 
cut across historic trade routes, vital canal systems an 
integrated rail network, and have no sharp distinguishing 
features Pakistan s cities and much of its vital internal 
rail and road links are within a few minutes of the Indian 
border It is thus forced to defend itself from a forward 
position which inevitably looks threatening to India With 
the advent of high-performance strike aircraft all major 
Pakistani cities and airfields are bared to Indian attac) 
while Pakistan s newly acquired F-16s can strike at manor 
cities from Bombay to Delhi Also open to attack are vital 
facilities m  both states including major hydro-electric 
dams canal headworks nuclear generating and research 
facilities and India s offshore oil fields Hitherto such 
facilities have been spared during wartime but a future 
major war between the two states could as easily be more 
intense and destructive than those of 1965 and 1971
The India-China Conflict
Almost forgotten India and China still dispute several 
thousand square miles of territory m  the Northeast and
15
western Himalayas The land contains nothing of value but 
access across one portion (Aksai Chin) has been important 
for China in transiting to positions facing the Soviet 
Union China's claim m  the Northeast would put it well over 
the Himalayan n dqe lines enabling it to threaten India's 
line of communication with Assam and Nagaland The conflict 
is stagnant India has built at great cost a road network 
which gives it access to the border and China no longer has 
a marked military advantage Yet India is reluctant to 
seize lost territories by force
Th~ stace is set for a negotiated settlement (possibly 
m / o l 7ing a territorial swapï but certain barriers remain 
First the Chinese have persisted in regarding India as a 
Soviet stooge and are unbearably condescending second they 
rive ceen Pakistan s chief weapons supplier since 1965 and 
offered significant diplomatic support to Pakistan m  its 
conflicts with India, stopping ]ust short of military action 
m  1965 and 1971 third India itself benefits from a 
continuation of the conflict to the degree tnat it places 
India on the same side as the U S S R  (which has an almost 
identical territorial conflict with China) Soviet support 
for India is rooted m  this common strategic interest and 
India benefits materially m  arms technology and favorable 
trade arrangements India will be reluctant to alienate the 
Soviets over China unless its own arms sources are further
diversified
IC
mhe Soviet Union A Permanent Sout!"» Asia Pcwer7
The Soviet invasion of Afqhanistan in December, 1^79, 
was the result of a deteriorating situation within 
Afghanistan and a faulty Soviet estimate of what it would 
take to set things right An avowed]y pro-Soviet regime was 
about to be toppled and the Brezhnev doctrine provided all 
the excuse necessary to rescue it ^  Claims that the Afghan 
government was threatened by Western Pakistan or Chinese 
aqents are patently false the Marxist government had 
itself created its own opposition throuah incompetence ard 
pruta1lty
However it does not seem likely that the Soviets 
foresaw the difficulties of intervention Soviet scholars 
are well aware of Afghanistan s tribal complexities its 
tradition of resistance to invasion and the nature of the 
terrain Soviet generals seem not to have been listening 
or perhaps they took the advice of Kim Philby, now a KGB 
general who has written derisively of the reputation of 
tribal warriors 13 Now m  its fifth year the war appears 
to be stalemated the Soviets control no more than 153- of 
Afghanistan on a continuous basis they have not been able 
to build up loyal Afghan military or civilian cadres and 
they are unable to stop the fresh recruitment of Mujahiddm
based m  Pakistan Iran and Afghanistan itself
Interestingly this is a situation which pleases a
17
number of states Pakistan is aqain m  the forefront of 
strategic importance and has benefitted enormously m  
material and political terms (although it does run 
considerable risks) some Americans and Chinese see 
Afghanistan as a Russian disaster and are pleased to have 
the war continue weapons and assistance reach the 
Muhajidd^n m  quantities adequate to keep the war going 
perhaps indefinitely
Here, the prospects for resolution are dimmer than m  
the India-China conflict First, the Russians may have come 
to see Afghanistan as a potential base from which they could 
move soutn or west No evidence exists that such 
considerations motivated Soviet intervention but they are 
now m  a position to take advantage of new opportunities 
Second, the Mujahiddm themselves will not stop fighting 
nor will they likely come to an agreement /ith Kabul unless 
the Soviets leave (m  which case, no Kabul ao/ernment could 
stand by itself) Third one must note the virtual absence 
of creative thought on how to get the Soviets out of 
Afghanistan I know of only two serious plans One 
involves the negotiations now beinq held under UN auspices 
in which a Soviet withdrawal is geared to a reduction m  
Pakistani support for the Mu]ahiddm (and which is stuck 
over the length and conditions under which the Soviet 
pullout would take place) ^ e  other is the proposal of 
Jagat Mehta m  which a neutral outside military force would
IP
assume control over Afghanistan as the Soviets withdrew and 
allow for a collective Afghan decision as to the formation 
of a new government ^  Interestingly the proposal with the 
least likelihood of success is the one before the UN, which 
may be a measure of the seriousness of the participants
III FROM THE PRESENT TO THE FUTURE 
The major military states of South Asia, India and 
Pakistan are each locked m  a double struggle They are 
first pitted against each other m  a conflict of greater 
duration than substance Second they each fear their 
powerful neighbors, China and the Soviet Union respectively 
and seek assistance from the enemy of my enemy who happen 
to be, conveniently, also enemies But they also ha;e other 
interests which are not in conflict Among these are a 
shared position on the issue of the development of the 
so-called Third World, the short-sighted nuclear policies of 
the superpowers the growth of South Asia as a center of 
technology, expertise, and food for the rich but backwards 
states to the west, and a number of regional economic and 
social problems which are best treated on a multilateral 
basis Above all they do have an interest in avoiding war 
and reducing the burden of preparing for war
The essential tragedy of South Asia has been that both 
India and Pakistan (and to a lesser extent Bangladesh,
Nepal and Sri Lanka) have been willing to subordinate these
19
common interests rather than explore ways of ameliorating or 
reducing security-based conflicts To be fair, these 
conflicts have at times been imposed from without, and 
security is never free, nor is any state ever perfectly 
secure, but there is no doubt that the burden of Indian and 
Pakistan defense efforts are aimed at each other not 
towards external threats
The situation is doubly harmful to India which by any 
standard is a qreat power Yet, other states regard it as a 
minor power because it is unable to avoid the comparison 
with Pakistan— one is judged by the quality of enemies one 
keeps And of course Pakistan is doomed to minor power 
status by virtue of its proximity to the three largest 
states in the world
Three choices are open to the two states domination 
by the regional great power, India continued competition 
between it and a Pakistan supported by extra-regional 
states and cooperation between India and Pakistan Th^ 
first and the last patterns would give the region a center 
of political gravity that it has not had since the departure 
of the British This was the pattern envisaged by the 
British Indian military, who expected the two dominions to 
keep the old Indian army intact The Soviet and Chinese 
penetration of the Subcontinent suggest that the British 
were correct in their stress on the need for cooperation 
But three caveats may be raised would not Indian
?0
domination be an effective and quick resolution of the 
problem9 Miqht not the difficulties of India-Pakistan 
cooperation be overwhelming9 Even if India-Pakistan 
competition were abated what assurances are there that this 
would have an impact on Soviet policy m  Afghanistan9 
My response to the first objection is that it is 
probably too late to realistically imagine the expansion of 
Indian power to the west Pakistan is likely to be in the 
possession of nuclear weapons m  the near future it could, 
even now mak^ the price of an Indian armed attack very 
nigh a destroyed Pakistan would only put Indian troops ^n 
direct contact witn Soviet forces, and there would be a 
struggle for the control over the remaining Pakistani 
territories finally it is still possible that Pakistan 
might turn to the Soviet Union and for some Russian 
calculations it would make a better regional power
The third objection is more difficult to deal with 
Indian influence on the Soviet Union is non-existent when it 
comes to basic strategic natters (the Russians did not even 
inform the Indian government of their irvasion plans)
Would they be more attentive to a joint India-Pakistan 
approach9 I think they would First, they would be unable 
to play the two off against each other and Pakistan could 
increase the pressure in Afghanistan knowing that its rear 
was protected Such pressure is a necessary component of 
getting the Soviets to the bargaining table and seriously
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considering withdrawal Second, a peace plan emanating from 
both South Asian powers would be credible Together they 
have adequate military power to control the Mujahiddm while 
a new government was formed, allowing the Soviets to 
withdraw with some shred of honor This combination of 
stick and carrot coming from non-aligned reqional powers 
would be more effective in the long run than direct American 
or Chinese pressure
This returns us to the prospects for India-Pakistar 
strategic cooperation I do believe that is a possibility 
the next few years and that many individuals m  both 
states have come to see that their common interests are 
increasingly important Yet there are real obstacles to 
movement m  this direction The first is the unstable 
politics of Pakistan itself thp role of the military has 
become a permanent feature of Pakistan politics but 
without either doctrinal base or popular support Secondly, 
Indians are suspicious of the U S role as Pakistan s chief 
weapons supplier The linkage between the Pentagon and the 
generals of Rawalpindi is an old theme m  India and it is 
one of Zia s qreat accomplishments to have bequn to persuade 
India that a general can be interested in regional detente 
Finally there are those m  India (and indeed Pakistan) 
who support the Soviet position that unity between these two 
states is frauqht with danger 'Hie last thinq the Russians 
want is a de facto security arrangement between these two
22
militarily effective states, having them turn their weapons 
outward, rather than upon each other The Soviets would 
like to see the present mini cold war between India and 
Pakistan go on indefinitely Each is then dependent upon 
the Soviet Union to some extent, if only because the other 
is the Soviets could, ultimately, emerge as the de facto 
balancer of the South Asian system, a feat that they 
attempted m  1965-8
Four Futures and Some Suggestions
Embedded m  the above analysis are four alternative 
security futures for South Asia These are 1) the 
continuation of the present status quo and hostility between 
India and Pakistan just short of war 2) Indian emergence as 
the regional dominant leader after the destruction of 
Pakistan s military capability 3) increased Soviet 
influence to the point where they manage the Subcontinent 
and 4) a cooperating India as regional leader The last 
would involve real detente between India and Pakistan the 
negotiation of a series of security and arms control 
agreements, joint determination of relative force levels and 
disposition of major units and (in the context of overall 
Indian dominance) an agreement that Pakistan could at least 
maintain a minimum deterrent— hopefully a conventional 
rather than a nuclear one
I have elsewhere argued that the last future is not
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an impossible aoal and that the presence of the Russians in 
Afghanistan and the Americans in Diego Garcia and elsewhere 
may be a stimulus to regional states to move m  this 
direction 15 What can outsiders do to encourage tnese two 
states , or at least to see that the present balanced 
imbalance between India and Pakistan does not come crashing 
down9
First it is essential to recognize that Pakistan s 
security will always rest on Indian good will (or at least 
Indian calculations of g a m  and loss) Helping Pakistan 
meet the crisis to the west without equally vigorous 
movement to the east is self-destructive, ard if various 
western powers have not recognized this at last it has 
become a major theme of President Zia ul Haq s campaign to 
restore normal relations with India Further, it must be 
recognized that a weak Pakistan is no less a threat to India 
than a strong Pakistan and many Indians are coming to 
acknowledge this point There is an appropriate range of 
Pakistani military power above which Pakistan becomes an 
unnecessary threat to India and below which it becomes a 
temptation to India the determination of these levels is 
one of the most critical regional security issues 
Secondly, outsiders must be clear about their 
priorities when it comes to nuclear proliferation Will 
they tolerate a nucleanzed Pakistan9 Will they tolerate an
Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear facilities9 Will they
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use force themselves’ What steps would they ultimately be 
willing to take to stop an Indian nuclear program7 What is 
interesting is that most governments have tried to postpone 
even thinking very deeply about the problem
Thirdly, there are areas where the major outside 
economic powers can make a useful contribution to regional 
stability There are a number of joint river and water 
projects that could be pursued by India and one or more of 
its neighbors there is room for expansion of informational 
and educational programs, and there are even joint regional 
nuclear programs that could be pursued which would benefit 
from outside support and encouragement If the vtfestern 
powers and Japan are serious about enhancing the rewards for 
cooperative behavior m  South Asia between India and 
Pakistan and are not to be entirely hypocritical about tneir 
nuclear policies, they should be offering to sponsor such 
programs
Finally, some day there will have to be movement or 
those territorial issues which are also disputes over 
national identity and purpose Kashmir is the most obvious 
problem but the Indian border conflict with China goes to 
the heart of India s perception of itself as an important 
power, and is also intimately related to the Soviet border 
dispute with China There may be little that outsiders can 
do here by way of direct intervention, but movement on these 
issues (or at least agreement to defer them while settling
25
more amenable ones) is a necessary part of a broad strategy 
of reconciliation
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